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Damages: A Call For Meaningful
Precedents
THOMAS R. NEWMAN*
The process of settlement negotiations is an essential com-
ponent of the contemporary administration of justice. Without
some mechanism for disposing of most cases prior to trial, our
courts would be unable to cope with the continual increase in
their case loads. There simply are not enough trial parts or
judges to try more than a small fraction of the cases filed each
year.' Settlement negotiations, however, cannot take place un-
less there are some recognized standards or guidelines by which
the parties, their attorneys and insurance company claims per-
sonnel can realistically assess the value of the case under
consideration.
In personal injury and wrongful death actions, the process
whereby a legally cognizable injury is translated into its mone-
tary equivalent is particularly difficult with respect to the intan-
gible pain and suffering element of general damages. The judi-
cial decisions dealing with the subject of damages are generally
so cryptic as to be of no assistance to anyone trying to price a
case by looking to what the courts have done in analogous
situations.
Justice Hopkins once noted that the "fulcrum" of an opin-
ion, on which its value largely hinges, is the point at which the
author "ends his discussion of the operative facts and law and
begins his explanation of the decisions."' That explanation is
what is needed in the decisions relating to the amount of per-
missible damages.
* LL.B., 1960, New York University; Partner, Siff & Newman, P.C.; Member, Int'l
Ass'n of Ins. Counsel; Member, Defense Research Institute.
1. "For the first 10 months of 1982, civil filings in New York City jumped 32%
compared with the like period in 1980." Wall St. J., Feb. 11, 1983, at 1, col. 1.
2. Hopkins, Notes on Style in Judicial Opinions, 8 TRIAL JUDGES J. 49 (1969), re-
printed in R. LEFLAR, APPzu.AT JUDICIAL OPINIONS 164, 166 (1974). Appellate lawyers as
well as judges can benefit from Justice Hopkins' guides for clarity of expression.
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It is recognized that "there is no magic or precise mathe-
matical formula for computing damages."'3 Adding to the diffi-
culty is the fact that no two cases are exactly alike and, even if
they were, no two individuals experiencing pain stemming from
a similar injury would describe it in the same way. Indeed, most
people are totally unable to articulate the nature and full extent
of their pain. Virginia Woolf, in her Essay on Being Ill, clearly
recognized this point when she wrote: "English, which can ex-
press the thoughts of Hamlet . . . the tragedy of Lear, has no
words for the shiver and the headache. Let a sufferer try to de-
scribe a pain in his head to a doctor and the language at once
runs dry."'4
The court of appeals, which because of its limited jurisdic-
tion does not ordinarily review damage awards involving issues
of fact and discretion, 6 recently had occasion to observe:
In no two cases are the quality and quantity of such damages
identical. As has been pointed out by pragmatists and theorists
who have wrestled with the problem of how damages in such
cases may justly be arrived at, evaluation does not lend itself to
neat mathematical calculation.'
Because each case is necessarily different, with the outcome
dependent on the application of discretion to always varying fact
patterns, it has long been settled law in New York that the "fix-
ation of damages in personal injury actions is peculiarly a func-
tion of the jury."'7 At the same time, our courts have always rec-
ognized that jurors should not be given unfettered license to give
away other people's money, and that there is a need to maintain
some measure of control over jury verdicts "as an exercise of
public policy."8 If permitted to stand, grossly excessive awards,
3. Rinaldi v. State, 49 A.D.2d 361, 364, 374 N.Y.S.2d 788, 792 (3d Dep't 1975).
4. V. WOOLF, Essay on Being Ill in 4 COLLECTED ESSAYS 194 (1925).
5. See, e.g., Tate v. Colabello, 58 N.Y.2d 84, 445 N.E.2d 1104, 459 N.Y.S.2d 422
(1983); Zipprich v. Smith Trucking Co., 2 N.Y.2d 177, 180, 139 N.E.2d 146, 146, 157
N.Y.S.2d 966, 967 (1956).
6. Caprara v. Chrysler Corp., 52 N.Y.2d 114, 127, 417 N.E.2d 545, 551, 436 N.Y.S.2d
251, 257 (1981).
7. Hallenbeck v. Caiazzo, 41 A.D.2d 784, 784, 340 N.Y.S.2d 947, 949 (3d Dep't 1973).
8. Miner v. Long Island Lighting Co., 47 A.D.2d 842, 847, 365 N.Y.S.2d 873, 881 (2d
Dep't 1975) (Hopkins, J., dissenting) (mem.) rev'd on other grounds, 40 N.Y.2d 372, 353
N.E.2d 805, 386 N.Y.S.2d 842 (1976).
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such as a recent $29 million verdict in a medical malpractice ac-
tion tried in New York Supreme Court, Kings County,9 would
bankrupt many defendants and their insurers and cause serious
dislocations in our society. Reviewing courts must take such fac-
tors into consideration. As one federal court noted:
The subject of excessive verdicts has been one of great concern to
the courts in recent years and the maintenance of verdicts at a
reasonable level is essential to the systematic functioning of our
economic and business system. Distorted figures, if persistently
reached in jury verdicts, will result in grave maladjustments and
gross injustices .... Judicial decisions must be rendered with a
consciousness of all aspects of our society. Our law has been
evolved for the purpose of regulating society.'0
The point at which a court may interfere with a verdict was
fixed by Chancellor Kent in Coleman v. Southwick" as follows:
The damages, therefore, must be so excessive as to strike man-
kind, at first blush, as being beyond all measure, unreasonable
and outrageous, and such as manifestly show the jury to have
been actuated by passion, partiality, prejudice, or corruption. In
short, the damages must be flagrantly outrageous and extrava-
gant, or the court cannot undertake to draw the line; for they
have no standard by which to ascertain the excess.12
9. Marcelin v. St. John's Episcopal Hosp., Nat'l L.J., Oct. 18, 1982, at 2, col. 3. (Sup.
Ct. Kings County Oct. 1, 1982). Although subsequently settled for a fraction of this
amount, the verdict in Marcelin exemplifies what is sometimes referred to as the "Game
Show" mentality prevalent among some jurors.
10. Becksted v. Skelly Oil Co., 131 F. Supp. 940, 944 (D. Minn. 1955). See also
Broder, Trial Tactics and Techniques, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 10, 1983, at 4, col. 2, where the
author, a well known plaintiffs' attorney notes:
However disturbed the Plaintiffs' Bar may be by such holdings, the most zeal-
ous advocate cannot forget that judges must consider the implications of jury ver-
dicts for the larger society in which we function. Completely unfettered jury
awards would have an adverse effect on the stability of our insurance system, and
thus indirectly, e.g., on the safety and convenience of the motoring and pedestrian
public, or on the smooth function of the health services industry. It is not only the
right, but surely the responsibility of the courts to be ever vigilant to protect our
system of justice against the possibility of destruction by such verdicts.
Id.
11. 9 Johns. 45 (1812).
12. Id. at 52. The opinion in Coleman contains the following additional observations
as to the respective roles of the court and jury:
The question of damages was within the proper and peculiar province of the jury.
It rested in their sound discretion, under all the circumstances of the case, and
1983]
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Today, the customary phraseology adopted by our appellate
divisions is that a reviewing court should not substitute its judg-
ment on the issue of damages for that of the jury unless the
amount of the verdict is so excessive, or inadequate, "as to shock
the conscience of the court."' Another formulation of the appli-
cable standard is that "[t]o avoid usurping the function of the
jury, the power [of the reviewing court] should be used only if
the verdict is so disproportionate to the injury as not to be
within reasonable bounds.""
Justice Hopkins has called attention to a further considera-
tion, and from society's standpoint perhaps an even more impor-
tant one, than merely asking whether a verdict "shocks the con-
science of the court."
[W]here a verdict awarded by the jury is so large, as in this case
[$2,000,000], the question of excessiveness is not so much whether
the size of the verdict outrages the court's conscience, but
whether the verdict is clearly beyond what ought to be reasona-
ble compensation to the plaintiff in terms of uniformity and
community expectations. In short, the court should not allow ver-
dicts which are far above the average in similar cases to stand.1
unless the damages are so outrageous as to strike every one with the enormity and
injustice of them, and so as to induce the court to believe that the jury must have
acted from prejudice, partiality or corruption, we cannot, consistently with the
precedents, interfere with the verdict. It is not enough to say, that in the opinion
of the court, the damages are too high, and that we would have given much less. It
is the judgment of the jury, and not the judgment of the court, which is to assess
the damages in actions for personal torts and injuries.
Id. at 51.
13. E.g., Petosa v. City of New York, 63 A.D.2d 1016, 1017, 406 N.Y.S.2d 354, 355
(2d Dep't 1978); Hofbauer v. Withey, 53 A.D.2d 926, 926, 385 N.Y.S.2d 200, 201 (3d
Dep't 1976); Rice v. Ninacs, 34 A.D.2d 388, 390, 312 N.Y.S.2d 246, 249 (4th Dep't 1970).
14. Riddle v. Memorial Hosp., 43 A.D.2d 750, 751, 349 N.Y.S.2d 855, 859 (3d Dep't
1973).
15. Miner v. Long Island Lighting Co., 47 A.D.2d 842, 847, 365 N.Y.S.2d 873, 881
(2d Dep't 1975) (Hopkins, J., dissenting) (mem.) (emphasis added), rev'd on other
grounds, 40 N.Y.2d 372, 353 N.E.2d 805, 386 N.Y.S.2d 842 (1976).
As to how a court ascertains the "community expectations," see Hopkins, Public
Policy and the Formulation of a Rule of Law, 37 BROOKLYN L. REv. 323 (1971), where
Justice Hopkins observed:
The disclosure of public opinion by samplings obtained from the citizenry or
by testimony either within or outside the record has not been attempted by the
courts. Instead, intuition, which has hardened into certainty, is the manner in
which the court's sense of "general and well settled public opinion" is gathered.
Id. at 332.
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Such general statements as to when a court will interfere
with a jury's verdict, however, do not give any practical guidance
to attorneys who must advise their clients whether an offer or
demand is fair and reasonable, or to the insurance company
claims personnel who must set adequate reserves if they are to
maintain the solvency of their company. These individuals need
more than generalizations; they need tools to assist them in try-
ing to predict in a particular case just what amount is likely to
"shock the conscience of the court," or will exceed "what ought
to be reasonable compensation to the plaintiff in terms of uni-
formity and community expectations." Meaningful settlement
negotiations cannot take place unless there is some commonly
understood and agreed upon basis whereby all interested parties
can assess how the appellate division might be expected to react
to the facts of their case.1 6
Unfortunately, the type of decision that is most often ren-
dered by our appellate divisions in cases involving claims of ex-
cessiveness or inadequacy of awards gives no indication of either
the facts or the factors that led the court to its result." It, there-
fore, fails to furnish the necessary basis for comparison with
other cases. For example, in Bishop v. Metropolitan Transpor-
tation Authority,1 8 other than noting that the injuries to plain-
tiff, a twenty-three year-old housewife with two small children,
"were extensive and will be permanent," the decision gives no
clue as to the nature of the injuries or why the court reduced the
jury's $1,500,000 verdict to $750,000. Most cases do not even say
as much as Bishop.
The cryptic form of entry in Lovaglio v. Chen 9 is more typ-
ical of what anyone attempting to do legal research in this un-
marked area of the law is likely to encounter:
Judgment, insofar as it is in favor of the infant plaintiff ... re-
16. "The prophesies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more preten-
tious, are what I mean by the law." Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 H~Av. L. REv. 457,
461 (1897).
17. This is to be contrasted with decisions of the appellate division relating to the
appropriate measure of damages, as distinguished from quantum of damages. See, e.g,
the full discussion by Mr. Justice Hopkins in Kaval Constr. Corp. v. State Div. of
Human Rights, 39 A.D.2d 347, 334 N.Y.S.2d 341 (2d Dep't 1972).
18. 60 A.D.2d 519, 519, 400 N.Y.S.2d 2, 3 (1st Dep't 1977).
19. 57 A.D.2d 859, 859, 393 N.Y.S.2d 1021, 1022 (2d Dep't 1977).
1983]
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versed, on the law, and as between the infant plaintiff and the
appealing defendants, action severed and new trial granted with
respect to the issue of damages only, with costs to abide the
event, unless within 20 days after entry of the order to be made
hereon, plaintiffs shall serve and file in the office of the clerk of
the trial court a written stipulation consenting to reduce the ver-
dict in favor of the infant plaintiff from $1,250,000 to $750,000,
and to the entry of an amended judgment accordingly, in which
event, the judgment in her favor, as so reduced and amended, is
affirmed, without costs or disbursements. The findings of fact are
affirmed. The amount of the verdict in favor of the infant plain-
tiff was excessive to the extent indicated herein.20
The decisions are no more illuminating when the appellate divi-
sion concludes that the verdict was inadequate and that an ad-
ditur is appropriate.2 1 Although Nour v. Nour,22 for example,
was decided by a divided court, neither the relevant facts nor
the basis of disagreement among the justices is revealed in the
court's memorandum. 23
An even more glaring example of the court's silence is found
in Quddus v. Colontonio,2' where the trial court set aside the
jury verdict in favor of plaintiff and ordered a new trial on the
issue of damages unless plaintiff stipulated to reduce the dam-
ages from $650,000 to $70,000. On appeal, the appellate division
concluded that part of the award should be reinstated and modi-
fied the judgment by substituting the sum of $200,000 for the
sum of $70,000 fixed by the trial judge. Although the two courts
20. Id. at 859. Review of the record on appeal in Lovaglio discloses that plaintiff, an
infant, approximately three years of age, underwent the amputation of her leg below the
knew because of defendant's malpractice. Record at 31a-32a.
21. See, e.g., Nour v. Nour, 88 A.D.2d 948, 451 N.Y.S.2d 384 (2d Dep't 1982);
Wadler v. Wadler, 88 A.D.2d 639, 639, 450 N.Y.S.2d 768, 769 (2d Dep't 1982).
22. 88 A.D.2d 948, 451 N.Y.S.2d 384 (2d Dep't 1982).
23. The entry in Nour reads as follows:
Judgment reversed, on the law, and new trial granted limited to the issue of dam-
ages only, unless within 20 days after service upon defendant of a copy of the
order to be made hereon with notice of entry, he serves and files in the office of
the clerk of the Supreme Court, Nassau County, a written stipulation consenting
to increase the verdict in plaintiff's favor to the principal sum of $40,000, and to
the entry of an amended judgment accordingly, in which event, the judgment, as
so increased and amended, is affirmed. Plaintiff is awarded costs on the appeal.
The damages were inadequate to the extent indicated.
Id. at 948, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 384.
24. 90 A.D.2d 789, 455 N.Y.S.2d 744 (2d Dep't 1982).
[Vol. 3:605
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had widely differing views of the amount of damages that could
be awarded without shocking their respective consciences, the
appellate division's decision states no facts and provides no in-
sight as to the court's reasoning.
The foregoing discussion shows that the prevailing practice
is for appellate courts not to write informative opinions on ques-
tions relating to the amount of damages."5 This practice, under-
standably, may be the product of the enormous case load which
each justice of the appellate division is presently being asked to
carry; in 1981, the four departments of the appellate division
had a combined caseload of 9,255 cases.26 If so, that calls for
much needed and long delayed remedial measures, such as the
proposal contained in the American Judicature Society's (A.J.S.)
study, Appellate Justice in New York, to create a fifth depart-
ment;2 7  it does not lessen the need for more meaningful
precedents.
It is significant that current practice rarely reflects the the-
ory to which the appellate courts subscribe, and to which their
opinions periodically refer. This theory was enunciated over
sixty years ago in Fried u. New York, New Haven & Hudson
Railroad2 8 where an $85,000 verdict, at that time the largest ver-
dict in an action for personal injuries, was held excessive com-
pensation for the foreman of a gang of electric linemen who lost
25. There are, of course, exceptions. Illustrative cases containing excellent discus-
sions of the operative facts and the nature of the injuries involved include Warmsley v.
City of New York, 89 A.D.2d 982, 454 N.Y.S.2d 144 (2d Dep't 1982); Juditta v. Bethle-
hem Steel Corp., 75 A.D.2d 126, 428 N.Y.S.2d 535 (4th Dep't 1980); and Zaninovich v.
American Airlines, Inc., 26 A.D.2d 155, 271 N.Y.S.2d 866 (1st Dep't 1966).
26. See R. MACCRATE, J. HOPKINS, & M. ROSENBERG, APPELLATE JUSTICE IN NEW
YORK 99 (1982).
27. Id. The authors of the A.J.S. study make the following pertinent observations:
Predicated upon their study of intermediate appellate courts, the authors of
Justice on Appeal [Carrington, Meador and Rosenberg (1976)] concluded that if
the mix of cases in not more or less difficult than the usual mix of cases for state
intermediate courts, about 100 dispositions per judgeship was the maximum that
could be asked for without eroding the essential qualities of appellate justice.
In recent times, the staggering number of appeals that each justice and panel
is called upon to decide exceeds the optimum 100/400 formula recommended by
the authors of Justice on Appeal by vast margins. When motion calendars are
included in the routine work of the justices, the acute problem evinced by these
statistics is further exacerbated.
Id. at 100-101.
28. 183 A.D. i15, 170 N.Y.S. 697, 704, aff'd, 230 N.Y. 619, 130 N.E. 917 (1921).
19831
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both arms at the shoulder sockets and suffered other injuries as
the result of burns sustained when he came in contact with a
high tension wire. Although acknowledging that the injuries
"were very serious, inflicting necessarily great pain and anguish,
and resulting in total and permanent physical disability," the
appellate division concluded "that $55,000 is all that could be
properly awarded."' 9 The court enumerated the considerations
that led to its result as follows:
A long course of practice, numerous verdicts rendered year after
year, orders made by trial justices approving or disapproving
them, decisions on the subject by appellate courts, furnish to the
judicial mind some indication of the consensus of opinion of ju-
rors and courts as to the proper relation between the character of
the injury and the amount of compensation awarded.30
It is only by comparison of the award under scrutiny with recent
verdicts in cases involving comparable injuries that some stan-
dard of uniformity and predictability can be attained in this im-
portant area of the law."
Generally the kind of decisions currently being handed
down by the appellate divisions cannot be said to "furnish to the
judicial mind some indication of the consensus of opinion of ju-
rors and courts as to the proper relation between the character
of the injury and the amount of compensation awarded. 3 2 They
29. Id. at 125.
30. Id. (emphasis added).
31. The Fried case was quoted recently in Senko v. Fonda, 53 A.D.2d 638, 639, 384
N.Y.S.2d 849, 851-852 (2d Dep't 1976), where the majority voted to reduce an award
from $71,500 to $50,000, noting that "prior verdicts may guide and enlighten the court,
and, in a sense, may constrain it." The court in Senko continued as follows:
It was observed in one early opinion: "Long observation of the action of juries in
cases of [similar] personal injury . . . affords a clue to the judgment of ordinary
men as to the compensation that should be made for pain and suffering; and
where a verdict is much above or much below the average, it is fair to infer, unless
the case presents extraordinary features, that passion, partiality, prejudice, or
some other improper motive has led the jury astray." (Jennings v. Van Schaick, 13
Daly 7, 8-9 (1884); Becker v. Albany Ry., 35 App. Div. 46). Recent verdicts in
cases involving comparable injuries have been much lower than the $71,500 award
in the case at bar.
Id.
32. Senko v. Fonda, 53 A.D.2d 638, 639, 384 N.Y.S.2d 849, 851 (2d Dep't 1978)
(quoting Fried v. New York, New Haven & Hudson R.R., 183 A.D. 115, 125, 170 N.Y.S.
697, 704 aff'd, 230 N.Y. 619, 130 N.E. 917 (1921). There are, of course, exceptions. Senko
is an example of the type of opinion that is very helpful to the bar.
[Vol. 3:605
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are virtually useless as precedentsa3 for only the litigants in-
volved and those interested attorneys who have access to a law
library containing the records on appeal will be in a position to
know the facts underlying the decision; even they will never
know which of those facts, singly or in combination, were instru-
mental in persuading the appellate court to reach its decision.
Since "opinions must be read in the setting of the particular
cases and as the product of preoccupation with their special
facts, ' 4 it is not unreasonable to ask that the courts disclose
those "special facts."
Even justices of the appellate division, unless they were on
the panel that decided the case, may be unaware of a relevant
decision or the facts and reasoning behind it. It is, therefore,
possible for two panels of the same appellate division to arrive
at vastly different evaluations of cases involving very similar in-
juries because a later panel may be unaware of a decision by an
earlier panel.
Although periodic changes in the maximum amount of com-
pensation which the appellate divisions will permit as a matter
of public policy have been observed, the limits prevailing at any
given time seem almost unrelated to the particular injuries of
the case under consideration. If, in fact, some sort of under-
standing or informal agreement has been arrived at among the
members of a court that no award should be permitted to exceed
a certain sum, lawyers are entitled to know that so they may
take it into consideration when advising their clients.
Thus, although there were a number of jury verdicts award-
33. In one of his most caustic passages, Jonathan Swift charged the legal profession
with taking "special care to record all the decisions formerly made against common jus-
tice and the general reason of mankind" and producing these "under the name of prece-
dent ... as authorities, to justify the most iniquitious opinions." GULLIVER'S TRAVELS,
Voyage to the Houyhnhnms, Ch. V, at 256 (Universal Lib. ed.).
Swift's views notwithstanding, citation of cases and their use as precedents continue
to be an important part of the preparation of appellate briefs. To aid the court in reach-
ing a reasoned result, consistent with the results in similar cases, counsel should be able
to look at meaningful decisions to find support for their arguments as to the excessive-
ness or inadequacy of an award of damages in personal injury actions.
34. Danaan Realty Corp. v. Harris, 5 N.Y.2d 317, 322, 157 N.E.2d 597, 600, 184
N.Y.S.2d 599, 603 (1959). The same thought was expressed somewhat differently by Jus-
tice Jackson in Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126, 132-33 (1944), where he noted
that "it is timely again to remind counsel that words of our opinions are to be read in the
light of the facts of the case under discussion."
1983]
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ing damages in excess of $1 million during the 1970's, it was not
until the very end of the decade that the inflationary trend dis-
cernible in trial court judgments reached our appellate divisions.
Prior to that time, verdicts in excess of $1 million were consist-
ently reduced, without explanation, to amounts below $1 mil-
lion.3 5 In Coleman v. New York City Transit Authority,6 in-
volving the amputation of both legs of the twenty year-old
plaintiff, the court reduced the jury verdict of $1,800,000 to
$930,000; in Passantino v. Board of Education,3 7 the appellate
division reduced an award of $1,800,000 to an eighteen year-old
quadriplegic to $1 million. Perhaps the result most difficult to
understand was in Calloway v. Dalton,8 where the appellate di-
vision reduced an award from $1,184,000 to $984,000.11 One
must assume the court did not want to create a precedent lead-
ing to a higher level of sustainable awards by affirming a judg-
ment in excess of $1 million.
The unannounced, but generally perceived, $1 million bar-
rier was finally shattered in 1979 by the appellate division, sec-
ond department, in Ukson v. City of New York," when the
court reduced an award from $2.9 million to $1.5 million with no
explanation other than that "[tihe verdict was excessive to the
extent indicated herein." Although not stated in the decision,
the plaintiff in Ukson was a fifty-seven year-old quadriplegic.
For a time, it seemed as though New York appellate courts
would sustain only awards in excess of $1 million in catastrophic
injury cases involving quadriplegics. Then, again without any
35. The only exception, and the first New York appellate decision upholding an
award in excess of $1 million, was King v. State, 56 A.D.2d 964, 393 N.Y.S.2d 93 (3d
Dep't 1977), where an award of $1,035,000 to a 17-year old quadriplegic was affirmed.
36. 44 A.D.2d 673, 355 N.Y.S.2d 326 (1st Dep't 1974), af/d, 37 N.Y.2d 137, 332
N.E.2d 850, 371 N.Y.S.2d 663 (1975).
37. 52 A.D.2d 935, 383 N.Y.S.2d 639 (2d Dep't 1976), rev'd and complaint dis-
missed, 41 N.Y.2d 1022, 363 N.E.2d 1373, 395 N.Y.S.2d 628 (1977).
38. 63 A.D.2d 941, 406 N.Y.S.2d 983 (1st Dep't), appeal dismissed, 45 N.Y.2d 819,
381 N.E.2d 606, 409 N.Y.S.2d 208 (1978).
39. The record on appeal discloses that plaintiff in Calloway was a 29 year-old wo-
man with two young children. Record at 1066. She suffered brain damage which ren-
dered her totally unemployable as a nurse. Her devastating injuries included a spastic leg
resulting in a permanent limp, hemiplegia of the arm, unclear and hesitant speech, loss
of senses of smell and taste, loss of short term memory and inability to concentrate.
Record at 1066, 1106-9.
40. 68 A.D.2d 926, 414 N.Y.S.2d 296 (2d Dep't 1979).
[Vol. 3:605
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discussion, the appellate division, first department, in Dukes v.
Strand Auto Sales4 ' allowed a young woman to retain $1.5 mil-
lion of an original $5 million jury verdict, which the trial judge
had already reduced as excessive to $2.1 million. The record in
Dukes shows that the twenty-two year-old plaintiff was rendered
totally disabled because of permanent pain and an inability to
sit for prolonged periods following surgery on her back which
resulted in scar tissue pressing on the spinal nerves. But she was
still vastly better off than a quadriplegic. Thereafter, other
awards for more than $1 million were upheld in a variety of
cases. In Sullivan v. Held,"2 the court sustained a $1.1 million
award to a thirty-four year-old brickworker who broke both an-
kles and was permanently disabled; in Burton v. Brooklyn Doc-
tors' Hospital," an RLF blindness case,44 the court reduced a
verdict of $2.8 million to $1.5 million; and in Kijewski v. Jur-
gau," the court reduced an award to a ten year-old boy who lost
an arm from $2 million to $1.25 million.
In light of this demonstrated willingness on the part of the
appellate division to sustain such large awards for injuries
which, while serious, did not approach the catastrophic dimen-
sions of quadriplegia, it was inevitable that the next
quadriplegic case would raise the maximum acceptable level of
damages to new heights. Caprara v. Chrysler Corp." was that
case; there the court reduced a $3.6 million award to a twenty-
one year-old quadriplegic to $2 million. The recent decision of
the appellate division, second department, in Warmsley v. City
of New York 4 7 affirming a jury award of $2 million to a forty-
three year-old woman who sustained a number of fractures and
whose leg was finally amputated below the knee following eleven
operations over a period of almost four years, seems to signal the
41. 74 A.D.2d 779, 426 N.Y.S.2d 966 (1st Dep't 1980).
42. 81 A.D.2d 663, 438 N.Y.S.2d 359 (2d Dep't 1981).
43. 88 A.D.2d 217, 452 N.Y.S.2d 875 (1st Dep't 1982).
44. Id. at 218, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 877. RLF (Retrolental Fibroplasis) is a progressive
disease leading to total blindness. Until the early 1950's, when the method of treatment
was changed, the disease was common in premature babies exposed to prolonged, liberal
application of oxygen to enable them to survive. Id.
45. - A.D.2d -, 457 N.Y.S.2d 533 (1st Dep't 1983).
46. 71 A.D.2d 515, 423 N.Y.S.2d 694 (3d Dep't 1979), afl'd, 52 N.Y.2d 114, 417
N.E.2d 545, 436 N.Y.S.2d 251 (1981).
47. 89 A.D.2d 982, 454 N.Y.S.2d 144 (2d Dep't 1982).
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beginning of another round in this cycle which is sure to send
the maximum sustainable limit spiraling upward.
If the pain and suffering of a plaintiff who has had multiple
fractures and a leg amputated is now to be valued at $2 million,
what sum will be considered fair compensation for a young man
who is a double amputee such as in Coleman,48 or for a young
quadriplegic as in Caprara,49 or for a totally brain damaged
baby who will require custodial care for the rest of its life? The
answer, of course, was that found in Gretchen v. United
States,60 where the dissent correctly noted that "[p]ain and suf-
fering cannot be eliminated by money, and any attempt to com-
pensate it by such must be held within reasonable limits."51
It would be unfortunate if the Warmsley52 decision were to
be read by other courts and judges as a green light for approving
even greater verdicts in more serious injury cases. Borrowing
once again Justice Hopkins' language, such awards would be
"clearly beyond what ought to be reasonable compensation to
the plaintiff in terms of uniformity and community
expectations. "53
Moreover, for the courts to sanction a process that will turn
plaintiffs' attorneys into instant millionaires (or even multimil-
lionaires if the verdict is large enough) upon collection of their
one-third contingent fees, will bring discredit upon the bar and
further deserved criticism of the administration of justice. If de-
cisions on the quantum of damages are not to be viewed as
purely arbitrary and capricious acts of the appellate courts, dic-
tated by the fortuitous circumstances of which individuals hap-
pen to be on the reviewing panel and the sensitivity of their re-
spective consciences, it is essential that there be guidelines and
standards governing their exercise of discretion." It was recog-
48. Coleman v. New York City Transit Auth., 44 A.D.2d 673, 355 N.Y.S.2d 326 (1st
Dep't 1974), afj'd, 37 N.Y.2d 137, 332 N.E.2d 850, 371 N.Y.S.2d 663 (1975). See supra
text accompanying note 37.
49. Caprara v. Chrysler Corp., 71 A.D.2d 515, 423 N.Y.S.2d 694 (3d Dep't 1979),
aff'd, 52 N.Y.2d 114, 417 N.E.2d 545, 436 N.Y.S.2d 251 (1981). See supra text accompa-
nying note 47.
50. 618 F.2d 177 (2d Cir. 1980).
51. Id. at 182.
52. See supra note 47.
53. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
54. The lack of meaningful precedents in this area may account for such statements
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nized long ago that "[jiudicial discretion is a phrase of great lati-
tude; but it never means the arbitrary will of the judge."55 Or, as
Justice Cardozo phrased it, "[d]iscretion is not unconfined and
vagrant. It is canalized within banks that keep it from
overflowing.'
'
"56
The truism that "[1]awyers, judges and jurors can do no
more than make an intelligent guess as to the extent of pain and
losses consequent upon personal injury, as no slide rule is availa-
ble to accurately gauge them," was noted in Cole v. Long Island
Lighting Co.5" This truism, however, merely reinforces the belief
that an effort should be made at better articulation of the
grounds for decision so as to afford the litigants, their attorneys,
and the judges, both trial and appellate, some basis for arriving
at a measure of predictability and uniformity in the law of
damages.
It has been suggested that "[t]here is an ongoing but silent
dialogue between the Justices of the Appellate Divisions and
settling attorneys. Usually settlements are somewhat in advance
of the courts' contemporary awards in recognition that if they
had remained unsettled, these cases might have broken new
ground in the appellate courts. ' 58 The portion of this dialogue
emanating from our reviewing courts should no longer remain
unspoken.
As it now stands, it is extremely difficult for most judges
and lawyers to objectively evaluate cases. This unsatisfactory
situation very often precludes or aborts meaningful settlement
negotiations, compels judges to decide cases on an ad hoc basis
(in much the same manner as a jury), and results in more ap-
peals being taken by dissatisfied litigants. The time for change is
as: "Each case must be assessed on its own peculiar facts and circumstances. Conse-
quently, prior decisions involving somewhat different injuries and circumstances are of
little assistance," Pratt v. Susquehanna Valley Cent. School Dist., 55 A.D.2d 713, 714,
388 N.Y.S.2d 726, 727 (3d Dep't 1976); or the court's reference in Batchkowsky v. Penn
Central Co., 525 F.2d 1121, 1125 (2d Cir. 1975), to "the error frequently encountered in
attempting to equate one personal injury award with another," and the limitation of the
"precedential value of a court's treatment of awards in other apparently similar cases."
55. In re Superintendent of Banks, 207 N.Y. 11, 15, 100 N.E. 428, 429 (1912).
56. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 440 (1935) (Cardozo, J., dissenting).
57. 24 Misc. 2d 221, 196 N.Y.S.2d 187, 195 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1959).
58. Broder, Trial Tactics and Techniques, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 10, 1983, at 4, col. 1. See
supra note 10.
19831
13
PACE LAW REVIEW
long overdue.
Addendum
In Cover v. Cohen,5 9 the appellate division, second depart-
ment, in a decision rendered after this article went to print, re-
duced a jury award of $3 million given to a sixty-two year-old
man whose legs were crushed when a car jumped the sidewalk
and pinned him against a wall. Plaintiff was hospitalized for sev-
enteen months following the accident. His left leg was ampu-
tated seven inches above the knee and, because of the injuries to
his right leg, he is now virtually confined to a wheelchair and
still suffers from "phantom pain" in his missing limb. The jury
also awarded plaintiff's wife $1 million on her derivative cause of
action for loss of services.
The appellate division reduced the awards to a total of $2.3
million, to be allocated $2 million to plaintiff and $300,000 to his
wife. The appellate division's memorandum opinion graphically
describes plaintiff's injuries and his pain and suffering at some
length, and then concludes:
Although the injuries sustained by plaintiff Astor Cover are
severe, in light of all the factors in this case, including his age (62
years old at the time of the accident in 1974), the damages
awarded were excessive to the extent indicated.2
The court's review of the facts is certainly welcome, and
provides the necessary basis for comparing the decision to other
cases. But the reader is still not given any clue as to what "fac-
tors in this case" persuaded the court that $2 million was the
maximum sustainable award for plaintiff's injuries, rather than
$1 million or $3 million or any other arbitrarily selected number.
Nor are we told how the court arrived at $300,000 as the proper
compensation for plaintiff's wife on her derivative cause of
action.
Is there any significant difference in the value of the Cover
and Warms1ey"1 cases based on such obvious factors as plain-
tiffs' ages (62 vs. 43), sex (male vs. female), site of the amputa-
tion (high above the knee vs. below the knee)? Should there be
59. N.Y.L.J., Mar. 30, 1983, at 15, col. 1 (Sup. Ct., App. Div. 2d Dep't).
60. Id. at col. 2 (emphasis added).
61. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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any difference? Did the court intend there to be any difference?
Did it equate the two injuries in terms of severity and simply
reduce Cover to the amount it had previously allowed in Warm-
sley? Did the court consider the effect of its decisions upholding
$2 million award in leg-off cases on awards in cases of even more
serious injuries? These are the types of questions that we hope
the courts will address in the future.
15
